The special fund for the Bundeswehr is not enough
Et is a gigantic sum that a rare coalition of the willing in the Bundestag has set in motion. Hundreds of billions of euros are to be spent in the coming years to armed forces into a force worthy of its name: capable of fighting, on which its allies can rely, and whose military might no opponent doubts.
The step is overdue. After all, the equipment gaps in the troops have been growing for decades. In the end, however, it first took the Russian invasion of Ukraine to persuade the traffic light coalition and the Union to make the effort that had now been decided. With the “special fund” worth a hundred billion euros, which is actually debt that the Germans will have to pay off from 2031, the Bundeswehr is to be upgraded in such a way that at least the major gaps in equipment are closed, and “quickly”, as the defense minister said Christina Lambrecht highlights.
The Federal Government has not presented an overall concept according to which criteria this should be done. But at least the shopping list can be read as a compilation of projects with which Germany wants to improve its contribution to the NATO planning goals that had already been decided and for which the money was lacking so far.
41 billion euros are earmarked for the often very expensive systems from the “Air Dimension”. This includes the American F-35 fighter jet. Germany urgently needs it to replace the museum-ready Tornado and to contribute to NATO’s nuclear deterrence. But there is also money for new Eurofighters for electronic warfare, for light and heavy transport helicopters – and last but not least for the armament of drones, about which the SPD in particular has repeatedly started new fundamental discussions for ten years – instead of finally using them to protect the get soldiers.
But has the list of projects to be financed in the special budget also been strategically thought through to the end in view of the Russian invasion of Ukraine? The alliance does not lack either combat aircraft or warships to stop a Russian attack on NATO’s eastern flank. The Americans can provide them quickly. But it takes time for a large number of American soldiers to be transported to Europe.
The three fully operational divisions that Germany had promised the alliance were needed as soon as possible. It is therefore hardly comprehensible why 60 billion euros should be spent on sea and airborne systems when Germany can, with all the effort, just provide one brigade for use on NATO’s eastern flank. The 17 billion euros for systems in the “land dimension” seem modest. This applies even under the proviso that the digitization of leadership skills in the Bundeswehr, worth 20 billion euros, will essentially benefit the army. It is overdue for the Germans to catch up with and communicate with their allies.
Defense budget should be increased permanently
The decisive factor, however, is that the hundred billion euros should only be a start. Because the way will be much longer than the money is enough. Many projects, such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) launched by Germany, France and Spain, will only become operational in the distant future. This will remain the case even if Lambrecht, in contrast to its predecessors, succeeds in streamlining the sluggish and inefficient procurement processes in such a way that complex armament projects will be delivered on time in the future. This does not yet take into account that the procurement list is based on prices for 2021 and that the galloping inflation is making procurements more expensive, as is the sharp rise in demand for armaments.
If Germany wants to live up to its security policy responsibility in Europe, which leading politicians like to repeat mantra-like, there is no way around a significantly higher defense budget of at least two percent of gross domestic product. Freezing the current budget, on the other hand, would mean that four-fifths of the defense budget’s personnel and operating costs eat up modernization. Projects would be prioritized again or canceled. The training of the troops would falter. Doubts would grow as to whether Germany would be prepared to use its armed forces in the event of war. For Germany, that would be a security policy declaration of bankruptcy.
