Schröder’s network: A book about the SPD’s involvement in Russia. – Politics

When the FAZ journalists Reinhard Bingener and Markus Wehner describe Germany’s path towards Russian energy dependence as the “greatest mistake in German foreign policy since the founding of the Federal Republic”, one could reply that it is also a – if not the – acted as a key success factor for the German industrial location; and last but not least by one guarantee of prosperity and social balance. With cheap out Russia imported energy, German companies manufactured all those products for decades, which they then exported to the world at hefty profits. Added to this was the fact that Germany had also settled comfortably in the costly area of ​​defense since 1990: protection and security were largely outsourced as the exclusive domain of the USA.

This decidedly German business model came to an abrupt end on February 24, 2022. If Russia had refrained from the military invasion of Ukraine and instead – as most experts predicted in advance – limited itself to setting up a permanent threatening backdrop for the purpose of sustained destabilization of Ukraine, it is very likely that huge quantities of Russian gas would still be leaking through the Pipelines – including Nord Stream 2 – flow to BASF and into millions of private households. And Bingener and Wehner had their book on the former chancellor’s “Moscow Connection.” Gerhard Schröder and his SPD probably never wrote.

They are very fortunate that they wrote it and hopefully the prelude to a detailed – also political – reappraisal of this inglorious chapter of German history at the interface of economic and foreign policy, Russia naivety and false lessons from history as well as tough lobbying and shameless self-enrichment.

The geopolitical compass was missing in Berlin

In terms of timeline, the volume focuses on the years 1998 to 2022, the period between Schröder’s assumption of office as chancellor of the red-green coalition and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is preceded by four chapters that outline the background: on the one hand, the political rise of Schröder and Putin and the respective networks; here not only biographical similarities but also character similarities become obvious. On the other hand the Development of German energy policy since the 1950s and the very special relationship of SPD to Russia. The latter is characterized by latent anti-Americanism and Willy Brandt’s policy of détente being exaggerated to the present day, which is why leading social democrats believed in the myth of “change through integration” even after the 2008 war in Georgia and the 2014 crime invasion.

It could be argued against the reader-friendly, but at times also quite striking presentation by Bingener and Wehner that the overall view is somewhat neglected. acting Angela Merkel as chancellor and the CDU and CSU in government responsibility is touched at best. The Union led the government for 17 years between 1998 and 2022, while the SPD only provided the chancellor for seven years. Structurally, Merkel’s Russia policy differed from Schröder’s at best in the key. Merkel also had the interests of German industry in mind, which can be seen from the fact that the share of gas imports from Russia between 2013 and 2020, i.e. mainly after the invasion of Crimea, rose from just over 30 percent to 55 percent.

Concrete cash flows to SPD members

Bingener’s and Wehner’s argument that it was also the Social Democrats in those years, above all Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Sigmar Gabriel as foreign and economics ministers, who shaped German Russia policy is only partially convincing in view of the policy competence in the Chancellery. In retrospect, one has to state that Germany’s mistaken path towards Putin’s Russia since the early 2000s was a political phenomenon – and is symbolic of the loss of a geopolitical compass at the end of the Cold War. Lonely admonishers, such as the chairman of the Munich Security Conference and former foreign and security policy adviser in the Chancellery, Christoph Heusgen, who pointed out the danger posed by Putin at an early stage, were not heard.

Certainly, however, came Schroeder a special position in the pro-Russian network of politics, business and trade unions. What Bingener and Wehner collect about the activities of the former chancellor is simply scandalous. The money that flowed into Schröder’s pockets, mainly from the Russian energy sector, is likely to have been in the seven-digit range – per year. One learns that there are some indications that corresponding agreements had already been made during his chancellorship.

For his friend Putin, Schröder was the jackpot among the western Russia lobbyists. Although Schröder did not enjoy a good reputation among SPD supporters due to the Hartz reforms, his contacts with the party leadership were unbroken even after he left active politics – above all the Lower Saxony network proved to be viable. In both 2005 and 2013, long-time Schröder confidants Gabriel, Steinmeier and Brigitte Zypries occupied important key departments for the Russia dossier with economics and foreign affairs. Schröder knew that the Nord Stream 2 project, which he helped to initiate and later as Chairman of the Board of Directors, was in good hands with Gabriel; as well as the politically highly explosive sale of German gas storage facilities to Gazprom in 2015, where Schröder also sat on the supervisory board. Nevertheless, the same applies here: It was Schröder friends who actively promoted the deals, but the Union did nothing to prevent them. Rather, Merkel stuck to the mantra to the end that Nord Stream 2 was a purely private-sector project in Germany’s interests.

In addition to Schröder, Bingener and Wehner can also attribute specific cash flows to prominent members of the “Moscow Connection” to Gabriel and the former member of the Bundestag and long-time Schröder adlatus Heino Wiese – but only after their retirement from active politics. With Steinmeier, who admitted mistakes in Russia policy in April 2022, there is no evidence of this; the same applies to Manuela Schwesig and Stephan Weil, who are also part of the core of the “Moscow Connection”. It was Andrea Nahles who, as party leader and in conjunction with Olaf Scholz, took the first steps in 2018 to trim the influence of the “Moscow Connection” in the SPD – for example by nominating Heiko Maas as foreign minister instead of Gabriel.

After the Russian attack on Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Lower Saxony, Weil, strictly denied the existence of a pro-Russian network within the SPD in an interview. Anyone who has read the book by Bingener and Wehner suspects that this is not true. The way to the Energy dependency on Russia pushed the network around Schröder to the best of his ability, partly out of wrong political considerations, partly – especially in the case of Schröder himself – out of a mixture of stubbornness and greed. However, the SPD is not solely responsible for the complete failure of German Russia policy over the past three decades.

Florian Keisinger is a historian.